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ROGER DURAND

University of Houston
ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to account for inter-state variations in public health
expenditures in an economically "have" nation, the United States, and in a
"have-not" nation, India. Three theoretical models, derived from studies
of social welfare expenditures in the American state, are formalized and
tested in both societies. Though not a major objective of this paper, a
relatively unknown method of model testing with important advantages for
comparative research is described. The principal findings of this paper are
as follows. One of the models tested here, that associated with the work of
Dye and Dawson and Robinson, is found to explain variations in the
budgetary proportions the American states devoted to public health. None
of the models, however, is able to account for inter-state differences in per
capita spending for health in the United States. Finally, none of the
theoretical models is able to explain variations among the Indian states
either in per capita spending or in the budgetary share devoted to public
health. Possible reason for the limitations of the models are discussed.
In recent years the determinants of policies and expenditures of subnational governments have become subjects of considerable scholarly
research. While such research has largely focused on the American states
(see Dye, 1966; Sharkansky, 1968; Hofferbert and Sharkansky, 1971; Brady
and Murray, 1975; Gray, 1976), several important cross-cultural, crossnational investigations have also been conducted. For example, Hogan
(1972) examined the relative influence of socioeconomic and political
variables on the expenditures of Mexican states and Canadian provinces.
Similarly, Glassberg (1973) reported on the linkage between voting behavior
and policy outputs in New York and London.
Authors' Note: The authors are grateful to David Brady and Kim Quaile Hill for their admonitions regarding an earlier draft.
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The results of these studies have yielded important insights into the
causes of variation in subnational, government expenditures and, especially,
into the relative influence of socioeconomic and political variables in accounting for variation . A number of significant gaps remain, however, both
in knowledge and in theory development. First, most studies have involved
multivariate statistical analysis to the important end of data reduction. Few,
however, have sought to estimate coefficients in a theoretical model and to
test hypotheses about such a model in different cultural settings. Accordingly, there are almost no cross-cultural theories of why relatively
autonomous, subnational governments spend as they do. Second, only a
limited number of comparative investigations have involved nation-states
which stand at the extremes of affluence and poverty. Yet, Peters (1972) has
persuasively demonstrated that at the societal level the influence of political
as opposed to socioeconomic indicators on social expenditures is likely to
depend upon the level of economic development. Specifically, his evidence
indicates that political variables are more important in accounting for the
social expenditures of transitional societies while economic variables are
more important for societies that have attained the modern stage of
development. A further exploration of differences between wealthy and impoverished nations, then, seems essential to an understanding of subnational expenditures. Finally, several major policy areas remain relatively
neglected topics of study, even in the American context. For example,
despite recent popular interest in national health insurance and health care
delivery systems in the United States, states' spending on public health has
not received the same attention accorded welfare and education.
The present paper seeks to increase our knowledge and theory by formulating and testing alternative models of states' public health expenditures
in India and the United States. In addition, though not a major objective of
this study, a relatively unknown method of model testing with several advantages for comparative research will be described. Three theoretical
models will initially be derived from existing studies of the social welfare expenditures of the American states . Following an examination of public
health policies, these alternative models will then be tested crosscomparatively for their ability to account for inter-state variations in health
spending in both India and the United States .
The Indian and American states have been selected here for investigation for several important reasons. Both India and the United States are
federal systems whose states enjoy considerable autonomy in making expenditure decisions. Also, both countries are politically and socioeconomically
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diverse with substantial subnational variations in such important factors as
interparty competition and economic development. And both have competitive political parties, operating in free elections, ' which encourage
popular participation. On the other hand, they stand at the extremes of affluence and poverty and thus afford a compari son of subnational, government expenditures in a "have" and a "have-not" nation.
THEORIES OF SUBNATIONAL VARIATIONS IN EXPENDITURES
At least three theoretical models of variations in welfare expenditures
may be found in recent studies of spending by the American states. The first
of these models has its origins in the writings of V.O. Key, Jr. and Duane
Lockard. In his monumental study of Southern Politics, Key (1949; 307)
emphasized the importance of inter-party competition-or its absence-to
programmatic politics. More specifically, Key took party competition or bifactionalism as the primary indicator of the degree to which politics was
"organized" or "disorganized" within a state. An organized politics, he
hypothesized, was necessary to the promotion of programs which benefit
the socially disadvantaged. On the other hand, in a disorganized politics, he
predicted, the disadvantaged could not effectively promote their interests
and thus would "lose" in the long-run.
Key's hypotheses received further elaboration by Duane Lockard. ln
his study of the politics of the New England states, Lockard (1959;
336-337) suggested that inter-party competition is more likely to flourish in
states characterized by relatively complex, developed economics. He then
showed that two-party competitive states were inclined to spend more for social
welfare programs (including aid to the blind, old-age assistance, and aid to
families with dependent children) than were their one-party counterparts.
Formally, these ideas and findings may be expressed by the following
mathematical model:
'As of this writing, free elections have been suspended in India . Nevertheles s, the data
used in this paper derive from a perod in which election s in India were free and open.
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X , (exogenous)
x 2 = b 2 ,x, + u
x l = bl2x 2 + v

Model I

Where X , is economic development, X 2 is inter-party competition, X 1
is social welfare spending, and u and v are errors or disturbances.
For convenience of mathematical expression, all variables in this model
are assumed to be measured from their respective means. This assumption
2
may be expressed in the language of expectations or expected values:
E(X)

= E(X 2 ) = E(X 3) = E(u) = E(v) = 0

Finally, a test of this model requires the following specification
" error s" or "disturbances:"
E(X ,u)

on the

= E(X ,v) = E(X 2 v) = 0

That is, the disturbance in each equation has an expected covariance of zero
with the variables predetermined in that and all previous equations in the
model. From this specification it also follow s that the disturbances
them selves have an expected zero covariance (i.e. are "uncorrelated"):
E(u,v)

=

0

(The importance of this specification to model testing is discussed below.)
The second theoretical model of expenditures is most closely associated
with the work of Thomas Dye (1966) and that of Richard Dawson and
James Robinson (I 963). According to this model, economic development is
a determinant of party competition and of many policy outputs in the
American states. Party competition, however, tends to have almost no independent effect on outputs. Rather, most of any relationship between party
competition and policy outputs is a resultant of associations between
economic development and party competition, and between development
and outputs. Variations in the expenditures of states are thus determined by
differences in levels of economic development and not by differences in
inter-party competitio!}.
Thi s model may be formally expressed in the following manner:
X , (exogenous)
Model 11
x 2 = b 2 ,x, + u
X 3 = b 3 ,X, + v
Where all symbols are the same as above.
' For th e reader unfamili ar with the algebra of expectation s, see Hays (1963), App endix 8 .
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This model requires the following specifications on the disturbances:

Again,
E(X,) = E(X) = E(X 3) = E(u) = E(v) = 0

A third model of expenditures in the American states was recently formalized and tested by Charles Cnudde and Donald Mccrone (1969). This
model suggests that economic development has a direct effect on social
welfare expenditure s as well as an indirect effect via party competition.
That is, a state's welfare spending is directly determined by that state's level
of economic development. In addition spending is also indirectly determined by development through the intervening variable of inter-party competition.
Expressed formall )'.,
X , (exogenous)

x =
X =
2
3

Model III

b 2 ,x , + u
b 32 X 2 + b 3 ,X , + v

Where all symbols are the same.
Again,
E(X,) = E(X 2) = E(X 3) = E(u) = E(v) = 0

The requisite specifications on the disturbances for this model are as
follows:
E(X ,u) = E(X ,v) = E(X 2v) = E(uv) = 0
To date, neither this nor the other two theoretical models of expenditure variation have been tested cross-nationally. The principal aim of this
paper is to provide such a test with respect to public health expenditures in
India and the United States. Before doing so, however, public healt h
policies in these two nation-states will be examined.
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PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY IN INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES
Health is an important public policy area in both India and the United
States and in recent years has received increased attention from policy
makers. In India major developments and changes in the public health field
came after independence in 1947. During the earlier, colonial period,
families and religious institutions were primarily responsible for the care of
the infirm. But with independence, the national government and the states
committed themselves to programs intended to provide minimally adequate
health care to all persons (Woytinsky, 1969).
Despite considerable national legislation, however, the role of the central government of India in public health has generally been quite limited.
The central government has been involved in nation-wide planning, international health, and research in addition to providing some financial
assistance. But actual health services and health policy making are a state
responsibility. In fact, the Constitution of India specifically charges the
states with these obligations (Hilleboe, Barkhuus, and Thomas, 1972).
This constitutional autonomy of the states in the area of public health
is reflected in considerable inter-state variation in health expenditures.
Table 1 displays the percentage of each state's total budget devoted to
public health as well as per capital health expenditures for the fiscal year
1968-69 - the most recent year for which complete and reliable data could
be obtained. 3 As the table indicates the State of Rajasthan devoted almost
11 percent of its operating budget to public health; in contract, Gujarat
devoted only 4.36 per cent of its budget to this area. Considering per capita
expenditures, Jammu and Kashmir spent about 8.5 rupees per person compared to the only 2.47 rupees expended by Gujarat. Such figures are indicative of substantial variations in the ways the Indian states have chosen
to exercise their public health responsibilities.
' Because we strongly suspect that the data reported for Uttar Pradesh was erroneous, this
state has been completely omitted from our analysis. When the analysis was done with Uttar
Pradesh included, no significant differences were found.
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TABLE 1

Public Health Expenditures of Indian States, 1968-69
State

Percent of Total Budget
on Public Health

Per Capita
Expenditures in Rs

8.33
7.26
8.80
4.36
6.25
7.23
9.77
9.11
7.37
8.36
6.71
6.98
7.19
10.89
9.00
7.62

3.92
4.45
2.50
2.47
4.13
8.54
6.62
3.93
4.42
5.36
4.19
3.89
6.02
5.99
4.36
4.53

Andhra Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Kujarat
Haryana
Jammu & Kashmir
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Madras (Tamilnadu)
Maharashtra
Mysore
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
West Bengal
Mean:
Standard
Deviation:

1.59

Mean:
Standard
Deviation:

1.58

Source: Statesmen's Yearbook, 1968-69.

Public health in the United States, by way of comparison, has witnessed
a growing and increasingly diversified involvement on the part of the national government. In spite of this growing federal involvement, howeve r,
public health continues to be one of the primary responsibilities of the
American states. State governments generally provide supervision over local
health departments, financial assistance to localjties and, through state
health departments, health care in areas without local health agencies.
Probably the most important state responsiblity, however, is the provisio n
of specialized state hospitals for the care of the mentally ill and for those
who have contracted tuberculosis and cancer. Such hospitals are operate d
directly by the states and are intended to make available services that local
governments could not afford (See Dye, 1973; 478-81).
As is true in India, the American states are not equally involved in the
provision of health services and facilities. Differences in the extent of state
activity are again suggested by the proportion of each states budget
allocated to health and by the amounts expended per capita. Table 2
represents these data for fiscal year 1968-69 - the same year considered
above for India. As the table indicates, Georgia devoted the largest
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budgetary share to public health: nearly 11.5 per cent of its total budget was
spent in this area. In contrast, South Dakota devoted only 3.23 per cent to
health. Considering per capita expenditures, New York ranked first among
the states having spent over $84 per person while South Dakota again
qualified for last place by spending only about $19.50 per person. Thus
there is considerable inter-state variation in the commitment of resources to
public health.

TABLE 2
Public Health Expenditures of American States, 1968-69
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nevada
New Hempshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Table 2 co111inued on page 48

Percent of Total Budget
on Public Health
8.1 I
3.41
4.65
6.44
6.39
7.29
6.61
5.58
9.18
11.49
5.73
6.68
6.66
7.74
5.87
7.09
5.72
7.60
4.97
7.98
7.72
7.74
7.21
8.16
4.51
8.85
5.91
6.19
5.35
10.30
7.40
3.40
6.13

Per Capita
Expenditure in $
36.07
41.65
26.81
28.54
49.94
44.16
38.48
39.40
44.53
54.62
45.74
33.16
37.14
37.64
34.94
35.94
28.66
40.18
23.87
49.07
49.16
47.58
31.42
39.78
26.28
68.03
28.68
32.75
32.57
84.13
28.86
21.26
29.08
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TABLE 2

Public Health Expenditures of American States, 1968-69
State

Percent of Total Budge/
on Public Hea//h

Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Mean:
Standard
Deviation:
Source: Government Finances, 1968-69.

5.80
4.93
5.39
6.04
9.54
3.23
8.96
6.49
4.70
3.79
6.89
5.61
5.88
6.05
7.11
6.55
I. 75

Per Capi1a
Expendi!ure in $
29.73
30.85
27.58
36.02
36.28
19.41
38.80
28.69
27.59
24.18
31.41
36.49
27.33
39.41
67.58
37.32

Mean:
Standard
Deviation: 12.41

MODEL TESTING
Having considered public health policy and inter-state variations in
health expenditures in both India and the United States, the three alternative models of spending will now be tested in both nation-states. The two
measures just discussed, the proportion of each state's budget devoted to
public health and a state's per capita health expenditures, constitute the
dependent variables for purposes of model testing. Data on these two
measures for India were obtained from the Statesmen's Yearbook for fiscal
year 1968-69. As already noted, this was the most recent year for which
complete and reliable data could be obtained. To insure comparability, data
on these same two measures were also gathered for the same fiscal year
from Government Finances in 1968-69.
It proved considerably more difficult to obtain comparable measures
of states' economic development and inter-party competition for both
countries. Conceptually similar, though by no means identical, scales of
economic development were constructed from the results of a series of factor analyses. The final factor solution for each country is presented in Table
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3. The measures included in the analyses for India were obtained from the
1971 Census of India; those for the United States from the U.S. Census of
Housing and Population, 1970. The development scale for each country
was constructed by additively combining the variable listed in Table 3 after
weighting each variable by its respective factor score coefficient.•
TABLE 3

Economic Development Factors for the States of India
and the United States 0
India
Electricity consumption per capita .899
Per capita income
.747
Gross industrial output
.671
Number of motor vehicles/ 10,000
persons
.610
Percent literate in the population
.499
Eigenvalue
2.95396
3

United States
Median School years completed
.980
Percent black in the population -.725
.588
Median family income
Percent engaged in
-.428
manufacturing
Percent living in urban areas
.336
Eigenvalue
2.52114

Entries denote factor loadings of variables derived from principal factors solution.
Factors were rotated to varimax criteria.

Comparable, cross-national measures of inter-party competition were
difficult to obtain largely owing to the existence of a multi-party system in
India. The measure finally selected for India is one involving the difference
between the number of seats held by the party with the lagest representation
in a state's lower legislative house and the number held by the party with
second largest representation in that same house. The smaller the difference
between the shares of seats, the more competitive the parties are considered
to be; the larger the difference, the less competitive. 5 Allocations of
legislative seats which resulted from elections held in 1967 were used.
This measure of competition was utilized for two important reasons.
First, since this research is concerned with state policies, it was deemed important to employ a measure based upon party apportionment in state
legislatures. Second, India's political system is modeled after the British
system wherein the lower house is the more powerful, both traditionally and
constitutionally, of the two state houses.
'On this conventional scaling procedure see Kerlinger (1973), chapter 29.
' On measures of party competition see Gopal and Hahn {1966), Rae (1967), and Milder
(1974). A second measure of party competition for India was also employed: the percentage of
seats held by the largest party in a state's lower house . Nearly identical results were obtained
using this measure.
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The measure chosen for the United States is one previously emp loyed
by Thomas Dye (1966; 54-59) in his study of state policy outputs. It is simply
the percentage of seats held by the majority party in a state's lower house .6
This indicant was calculated from the apportionment of seats in the session
immediately following the 1968 state elections.
Most studies of the determinants of expenditure variations either have
employed correlational techniques or have made use of standardized regression coefficients. Unfortunately, neither methodology is satisfactory
for comparative research. As Otis Dudley Duncan has demonstrated (1975;
Chapter 4) it could happen that the structural parameters or coefficients of
a model are identical of two or more populations under study. Yet, if only
the variance in the exogeneous variable(s) of the model differ(s) fro m
population to population, differences, would in general be observe d
between the populations in all the correlations and in all the standardize d
regression coefficients. That is, estimates of population correlations and
standardized coefficients will (in general) suggest that the populations diffe r
in only one : the variance of the exogeneous variable(s). It is, therefore,
possible to draw erroneous inferences about the comparative nature of
theory through the use of these strength of association measures.
Such erroneous inferences can be avoided by not expressing the
variables in standard form (i.e. dividing out the variances) when calculati ng
ordinary-least-squares estimates of the coefficients in the model. In this way
differences between the objects of explanatory interest, the structural coefficients of the model, and the variances and covariances that describe the
joint distribution of the variables in a population will not be obscured . This
is the procedure followed here . (For an extended discussion and elaborati on
see Duncan, 1975).
The concern of the paper, however, is not merely in testing a single
model in two populations but in choosing among three models in both India
and the United States. To demonstrate the method of model testing and
selection employed here, the proportion of each state's budget spent on
public health will be used as the dependent variable. Observe that one dif'T he Pear son's correlation between the percentage of seats held by the Democratic Party
in state senates and state lower hou ses was .969. This high correlation indicate s that almost
nothing could have been gained by including the partisan distribution of seats in upper state
hou ses.
Because the legislature s of Nebraska and Minnesota are nonpartisan, these two states are
omitted from the remainder of this analysis.
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ference between Model III and Models I and II is that Model III contains
the following prediction not contained in the others:

x 1 = b 32X 2 + b 1,x , +

v

(Eq. A)

Where symbols are as noted above.

If thi s prediction is sustained by the data, then Model III receives some sup port and the other prediction equation in the model may then be tested. If it
is not sustained by the evidence, however, Model III may be rejected and
Model s I and II considered.
To determine if the prediction (Eq. A) is supported by the data is to
estimate the structural coefficients in the equation. Thi s estimation was ac compli shed using a method described by Duncan (1975). The method involves calculating the coefficients from estimates of population variances
and covariances which can be computed from available data. As will be
seen, the principal advantage of this approach is that it shows directly how a
model generates the observable covariances. To illustrate , Eq . A was first
multiplied by one of the variables predetermined in the equation (either X ,
or X 2). Taking X ,,

x ,xl = b32x ,x 2 + b1,x ,x , + X,v
Taking expectations or expected values,
E(X 1X 1 )

=

b 12 E(X 1X 2 ) + b 11 (X 1X,) + E(X ,v)

Then , making use of the fact that the expected value of (X ,X ,) is equal to
the variance of X,; the expected value of (X, v) = 0 by assumption (see
Model III above); and that the expected value of (XiXj) = covariance of
X;Xi where i
j yields,

*

a-,1

=

b 12et ,2

+

b 1, a- ,,

(Eq. B)

Where et 13 and et 21 are covariances and et II is the variance in X ,. (It is
important to note that the variables are not in standard form. If they were,
et II would equal unity and Eq. B could be further reduced.) The covariance
between the dependent variables (X 1) and X , has thus been expressed as a
function of the structural coefficients in Eq. A (the b's), the covariance
between X, and X 2 , and the variance in X ,.
Next, Eq. A was multiplied by the other predetermined variable in the
equation, X 2 , and expectations taken,
a-21

=

b 12et22

+

b 1, a-2,
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Where a 23 and a 2 , are covariances and a 22 is the variance in X 2 •
Again , an expres sion was obtained which relate s covariance s, the structura l
coefficients of the model, and a variance term.
Then the structural coefficient s in Eq . A could be calculated . Observe
that the procedures just employed re sulted in two new equation s (B and C)
in two unknowns (b 31 and b 32 ) and in five terms (variance s and covariances)
which, because they could be computed directly from the data, are
"known" term s . Thu s the unknown term s, the structural coefficients,
could easily be solved uniquely.
Tables 4 and 5 present the variance s and covariance s for the variables
in the models for India and the United Sates, respectively. Subst ituting into
equations B and C with the proportion of total state spending on public
health as the dependent variable:
India
United States

( - .4402) = b 32 ( - .3488) + b 31 (.8575)
(2.2804)
= b 32 (336.678) + b 3 , ( - .3488)
( - .6835) = b 32 (7.1346) + b l, (.988)
( - 4.9096) = b32 (213.551) + b3 , (7.1346)

Solving both sets of equations simultaneou sly produced the following
values:
India
United State s
Substituting
States,
India

United States

b 32
b l2

= .00624
= - .0015

b3,
bl,

= -

.51081

= - .68355

these values into Eq. A for both India and the United
X 3 = .00624X 2 - .51081X ,
S.E. .02382
.47196
F
.069
1.171
2
R = .09
X 3 = - .0015X 2 - .68555X ,
S.E .. 01881
.27518
F
.000
6.170
2
R = .15

As an aid to model acceptance or rejection, standard errors and F-ratios
have also been calculated and included along with the equations.
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TABLE 4

Variances and Covariances Computed for lndia 0
N = 15
Economic
Development
Economic
Development
Party
Competition
Health Percent
of Budget
Per Capita
Health Spending

Party
Competition

Health
Percent
of Budget

Per Capita
Health
Spending

.8575
- .3488
-.4402
.1345

336.678
2.2804

2.5304

-12.6584

.7952

2.4844

aoiagonal entries denote variances; off-diagonal entries denote covariances.

TABLE 5

Variances and Covariances Computed for the United States 0
N = 48
Economic
Development
Economic
Development
Party
Competition
Health Percent
of Budget
Per Capita
Health Spending

Party
Competition

Health
Percent
of Budget

Per Capita
Health
Spending

.9982
7.1346

213.551

-.6835

-4.9096

1.8289

29.6688

3.0576
14.2869

154.1298

aDiagonal entries denote variances; off-diagonal entries denote covariances.

An examination of these structural coefficients (b's) and associated
statistics indicate that Eq. A is not supported by the data for either India or
the United States. For India the standard error of each coefficient is quite
large and the corresponding F-ratio quite small. Thus the coefficients do
not approach statistical significance at the .10 level-the level of type I
error used throughout this paper. For the United States, the b 11 coefficient
( - .68355) is considerably larger than its associated standard error and the
corresponding F-ratio indicates that this coefficient is statistically signifi-
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cant from zero. Since all coefficients in an equation must differ from zero at
statistically significant levels in order for the equation to be supported by
the data, Eq. A cannot be accepted for either country. Furthermore, as a
consequence of failing to accept Eq. A for both countries with respect to
percentage of the budget devoted to public health, Model III in which this
prediction is found must be rejected.
Using identical reasoning and procedures, the ability of Model Ill to
account for variations in states' per capita health expenditures was then
tested. Values for structural coefficients were again calculated from the
variances and covariances presented in Tables 4 and 5. Standard errors and
F-ratios were also calculated. The results were as follows,
India

United States

.03745X 2 + .14164X ,
.0220
.43997
F
2.845
.104
2
F = .20
X 3 = .10210X 2 + l.10229X,
S.E.
.14276
2.08797
F
.512
.279
2
R = .03
X3 =
S.E.

-

These results are generally the same as those obtained above for proportion of the budget devoted to public health. That is, the equation cannot
be accepted for either country since the structural coefficients have high
corresponding standard errors and fail to differ significantly from zero as
indicated by the F-ratios. Accordingly, Model lII may also be rejected as an
explanation for variations in per capita health expenditures in India and the
United States. 1
Having rejected Model Ill, Models I and 11were then tested. Structural
coefficients were calculated for the equations in these models according to
the procedures outlined above. Standard errors and F-ratios for the coefficients were also computed. The results are presented in Tables 6 and 7.
'Sca tterplots of residuals were examined for evidence of curvilinearity and
heteroscedasticity . No evidence of either nonlinearity or heteroscedasticity was detected in any
of the relationships for India. For the United States, however, some evidence of curvilinearity
was found in the relationship between economic development and party competition. Also,
heteroscedascity was found in the scatterplot of residuals obtained after fitting Eq. A. After
appropriately transforming variables, the equations for the United States were recomputed.
Although the structural coefficients for the equations were slightly altered, in no case were the
basic findings changed. Because the basic results remained the same, and because the conceptual meaning of transformed variables is often difficult to determine, the recomputed coefficients are not presented here .
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Both Models I and II predict that inter-party competition will be a
linear function of economic development. Consequently, the test of this
prediction is presented at the top of each table. Tests of the remaining equations are presented separately for the two models and for both dependent
variables.
As Table 6 indicates, neither Model I nor Model II may be accepted for
India . Contrary to the prediction of both models, economic development
was not found to influence inter-party competition at statistically significant levels. Furthermore, with a single exception (to be discussed), the other
predictions of the models are also not supported at significant levels. Thus
none of the three theoretical models developed in American state analyses
explains variations in public health expenditures in India.
TABLE 6

Tests of Models I and ff for India
Model s I and II
X, =
S.E.
F.
R' =

- .40674X , + u
5.49433
.005
.0004

Per cent of Budget Denoted
to Health
Model I

x, =

S.E .
F.

R' =

.00677X , +
.02397
.080
.006

V

Model II

x, =
S.E.
F.

R' =

- .51335X , + u
.45465
1.275
.09

Per Capita Spending in
Health

x, = - .03760X, +
S.E . .02142
F.
3.081
R' = . 19

x, =
S.E.
F.

R' =

. 156688X, + u
.47005
.11 I
.008

V
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TABLE 7

Tests of Models I and II for the United States
Model s I and II

X, =
S.E.
F.
R2 =

7.14681X
1.88149
14.428
.24

Percent of Budget Devoted
to Health
Model I

x, = .02299X +

v

S.E . .01731
F.
1.763
R' = .04
Model II
x, = - .68465X + u
S.E. .23747
F.
8.312
R' = .15

+u

Per Capita Spending on
Health

x, =
S.E.
F.

R' =

. 13893X +
. 12357
1.264
.03

V

x, =

l .83201X + u
S.E . 1.81203
F.
1.022
R' = .02

It is noteworthy, however, that the relationship between per capita
health expenditures and party competition does approach significance at the
.10 level. While the magnitude of this relationship is not large, it appears
that inter-party competition has some influence on the number of rupees
per person an Indian state will spend on public health. The greater the party
competition in a state, it seems, the less that state is inclined to spend-a
tendency contrary to that predicted by American state studies.
Table 7 summarizes the findings for the United States. As is indicated,
Model II-that
associated with the work of Dye, Dawson, and Robinson
-does
explain inter-state variations in the proportion of the budget
devoted to public health. Economic development is seen to bear a positive
relationship to party competition at statistically significant levels. Also as
predicted, development and the percent of the budget spent on health are
related. This latter relationship is negative in direction suggesting, as
previous research has shown that poorer states tend to devote a larger proportion of available resources to social welfare than their more affluent
counterparts (see Dye, 1966, 134-135). Hofferbert and Sharkansky, 1971,
473). Finally, party competition and percent of the budget are not
associated at significant levels. Model II may, therefore, be accepted as an
explanation of the proportion of each state's budget allocated to public
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health. This is a result well in keeping with the dominant findings of
American state policy research.
However, none of the three models can account for per capita spending
on health by the American states. As Table 7 demonstrates, per capita
spending is related neither to party competition nor to economic development at statistically significant levels. Consequently, all three models may
be rejected as explanations for inter-state variations in per capita health expenditures.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
To recapitulate, this paper has sought to account for inter-state variations in public health expenditures in an economically "have" nation, the
United States, and in a "have-not" nation, India. Three theoretical models,
derived from studies of social welfare expenditures in the American states,
have been formalized and tested in both societies. One of the models tested
here ("Model 11") has been found to explain variations in the budgetary
proportion the American states devoted to public health. None of the
models, however, was able to account for inter-state differences in per
capita spending for health in the United States. Furthermore, none of the
theoretical models could explain differences between the Indian states either
in per capita spending or in the budgetary share devoted to public health.
These findings may be attributed to differences between India and the
United States in stage of economic development. As noted earlier in this
paper, Peters has demonstrated at the nation-state level that political
variables are more important for societies like the United States that have
reached the modern ("have") stage of economic development. In the same
way, the relative importance of political as opposed to economic variables
in accounting for subnational, government expenditures may depend upon
a nation-state's stage of economic development. Thus among the American
states, economic development but not inter-party competition was seen to
bear a significant relationship to the budgetary proportion states devoted to
public health. Moreover, among the Indian states the relationship between
party competition and per capita health spending was seen to approach
significance but not that between economic development and spending.
Yet, this extension of Peters' stages of economic development argument fails to explain why states' development was not found related to per
capita health spending in the United States. Nor does it account for the
failure of party competition to influence the budgetary proportion the
Indian states devoted to public health. Consequently, the findings of this

132
research are probably not a product of societal "have-have-not"
differences. Rather, they may well be attributable to some fundamental limitations of the three theoretical models considered here.
Possibly one such limitation has to do with the variable of party competition. V.O. Key's theory of social welfare politics, which was the genesis
of most later studies, did not stress inter-party competition so much as the
extent to which politics was "organized" or "disorganized" within a state.
As Morehouse (1973) has recently suggested, it may be that party competition is a rather imperfect measure of political organization. This seems particularly likely in India where, unlike the United States, states dominated by
a single party (the Congress Party) may sustain either the most or the least
fractionalized politics. Accordingly, future studies might do well to incorporate more direct measures of political organization, such as the strength
of party leadership, into expenditure models.
A second possible limitation of the models considered here lies in the
process by which program innovations and, hence, new expenditures are
adopted. Walker (1969) found important regional differences in the propensities of the American states to adopt program innovations. These differences were sufficiently strong to suggest regional patterns of communication, competition, and emulation among states. Such regional patterns may
also characterize India: certainly the southern part of that country stands
apart from the rest owing to its greater industrialization and stronger British
tradition. If this is so, regionally-based communications and innovative
"cues" may be sufficiently strong to largely override inter-state differences
in wealth and party competition in determining per capita expenditures and
budgetary proportions. Thus it may be necessary to construct models which
either incorporate measures of innovation or which aggregate key variables
according to political region.
Whatever the case, the findings of this paper dictate that American and
comparative scholars alike search beyond the theories considered here if
general explanations are to be found for why relatively autonomous, subnational governments spend as they do.
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